University of Richmond

UR Scholarship Repository
Economics Faculty Publications

Economics

2018

Fiscal Forecasts at the FOMC: Evidence from the
Greenbooks
Dean D. Croushore
University of Richmond, dcrousho@richmond.edu

Simon van Norden

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/economics-facultypublications
Part of the Economics Commons, and the Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public
Administration Commons
Recommended Citation
Croushore, Dean and Simon van Norden. “Fiscal Forecasts at the FOMC: Evidence from the Greenbooks.” The Review of Economics
and Statistics 100, no. 5 (December 2018): 933-945. https:doi.org/ 10.1162/rest_a_00664.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Economics
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.

FISCAL FORECASTS AT THE FOMC: EVIDENCE FROM THE GREENBOOKS
Dean Croushore and Simon van Norden*
Abstract—This paper examines fiscal policy forecasts prepared for the Federal Open Market Committee and its influence on U.S. monetary policy.
The forecasts contain useful information beyond that in the CBO’s forecasts. Fiscal forecast errors are only weakly correlated with forecast errors
for inflation and output growth, but those for the budget surplus are highly
correlated with those for the unemployment rate and the output gap. Some
fiscal variables can also account for a significant fraction of the “exogenous” changes in the federal funds rate target that Romer and Romer (2004)
studied, consistent with the board’s statements on the importance of fiscal
policy.

I.

Introduction

T

HE zero lower bound on interest rates and subsequent
experimentation with quantitative easing have powerfully occupied the attention of macroeconomists and central
banks in recent years, and for good reason. At the same time,
however, the global financial crisis and the subsequent European debt crisis have highlighted a more persistent feature
of the monetary policy environment: the volatility of fiscal
variables. For example, the swings of U.S. fiscal policy from
large deficits in the 1980s, to large projected surpluses at the
end of the 1990s, to still-larger deficits thereafter, contrast
with the relative fiscal discipline of the previous decades.
While there has been considerable work on the accuracy of
central bank forecasts (such as those by the Federal Reserve
Board’s staff in the Greenbook), we are not aware of any
that have examined fiscal variables. Instead, some of the best
work on fiscal forecasts in recent years has been done on
Eurozone data, due in part to the availability of data sets
created in response to the Eurozone’s explicit restrictions
on fiscal policy. As we explain below, previous work on
U.S. data has used fiscal forecasts that are perceived to have
important defects. This motivates the need for better data on
fiscal projections and their forecast performance. Given the
Federal Reserve’s long-standing recognition of the role that
fiscal policy plays in monetary policy deliberations, which
we document in this paper, this is also needed to properly
characterize the monetary policy environment.
This paper begins to remedy that situation by documenting
and analyzing a new coherent database of Federal Reserve
Board forecasts of U.S. federal fiscal policy variables. In
addition to headline fiscal variables (receipts, expenditures,
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and budgetary surplus), we also provide long and consistent
historical estimates and forecasts of the cyclically adjusted
budget balance. These new series allow us to see the extent
to which monetary policymakers have been able to identify
and anticipate fiscal changes, as well as how these are related
to changes in other macroeconomic variables and monetary
policy decisions.
The evaluation of fiscal forecasts and fiscal policy also
raises a number of measurement-related issues. Evaluations
are commonly based on currently available macroeconomic
data. However, those data may differ in several ways from
the information that was available to policymakers at the
time. As Cimadomo (2016) notes, fiscal data are frequently
revised. Others, such as Croushore (2011), note that GDP data
are also frequently revised and business cycle turning points
are identified only with a lag, making real-time considerations important. We therefore carefully match fiscal forecasts
with contemporaneous data vintages of other key variables
to allow us to properly understand the information available
to policymakers. We believe this is the first paper to do so for
U.S. fiscal forecasts.
Section II discusses the literature on forecasts of fiscal
policy, followed by a review in section III of the narrative
evidence from the Board of Governors on the relationship
between fiscal and monetary policy. Section IV describes the
new Greenbook data set and the data transformations we use,
and we evaluate the quality of the Greenbook forecasts in
section V, testing them for bias and comparing the properties
of the forecast errors of the Greenbook forecasts to those of
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). The remainder of
the paper explores the relationship between the board staff’s
forecasts of fiscal variables and the policy decisions of the
Federal Open Market Committe (FOMC) in a variety of ways.
Section VI describes the relationship between fiscal forecast
errors on the one hand and forecast errors in inflation and economic growth on the other. Section VII reviews the measure
of monetary policy shocks proposed by Romer and Romer
(2004) and the extent to which such shocks may be related
to anticipated fiscal policy. The final section summarizes the
results and our conclusions.
II.

Forecasting Fiscal Policy Variables

The literature on forecasting fiscal policy variables is
sparse compared with that on forecasting monetary policy
variables. Perhaps due to the relative importance of fiscal policy discipline in the Eurozone, much of the recent literature
has examined fiscal policy forecasts in the European Union
(EU), where the institutional framework has been quite different from that in the United States. We therefore review
fiscal forecasting separately for the United States and the EU
to set the stage for our later analysis.

The Review of Economics and Statistics, December 2018, 100(5): 933–945
© 2018 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
doi:10.1162/rest_a_00664

934

THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS

A. The U.S. Experience

Two official government agencies forecast U.S. federal
government spending, revenues, and deficits: the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB). The CBO, a nonpartisan arm of the U.S.
Congress, is responsible for providing apolitical analysis of
government budget issues. The OMB is part of the U.S. Treasury Department and works for the president to analyze his
budget proposals. Researchers have compiled data sets to
analyze both forecasts on an ad hoc basis, but there is no
continuing program to update such data sets or to make them
available to other researchers.
In their recent analysis of the CBO forecasts, Kliesen and
Thornton (2012) show that the CBO’s one-year-ahead forecasts are not significantly better than a random walk, while
their five-year projections are worse (though not statistically
significantly worse). They also find that the CBO forecasts are
worse in recessions than in expansions, as we might expect
for most forecasts.
Other studies that examine both the CBO and OMB forecasts include Auerbach (1994, 1999), and Plesko (1988).
Auerbach (1994) shows that both CBO and OMB forecasts have generally been overly optimistic. Auerbach (1999)
examines the revisions to the fiscal forecasts, finding that
forecast revisions are serially correlated, suggesting inefficiency, especially for OMB forecasts. Plesko finds that
long-horizon revenue forecasts are biased upward, but most
other forecasts are unbiased.
A few other studies have looked at particular aspects of fiscal forecasts. Belongia (1988) compares the CBO’s forecasts
of deficits with those of the Council of Economic Advisers
(CEA) and private sector forecasts and finds no evidence of
bias in the forecasts, though private sector forecasts were
more efficient than the CBO or CEA forecasts. Reischauer
(1990) showed that the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act
changed the nature of the OMB’s summer forecasts, which
were used to determine sequestration under the law, making them more optimistic (forecasting smaller deficits) than
the OMB’s winter forecasts, which did not affect sequestration. In contrast to Plesko’s results, Blackley and DeBoer
(1993) find that forecasts of outlays were biased during
Republican administrations, perhaps because those administrations used the forecasts as a bargaining tool. Campbell
and Ghysels (1995) confirm Blackley and DeBoer’s findings
that the OMB’s outlay forecasts are inefficient.
Compelling rationales for the bias and inefficiency of the
CBO and OMB forecasts exist. The OMB is part of the government administration, and its forecasts are often used as
a tactical weapon in political budget battles. The CBO is
nonpartisan but is constrained to forecast revenues and expenditures according to the current law, so it cannot condition
on expected legislative changes. These inherent limitations
create a void for researchers attempting to model or measure
expected U.S. fiscal policy.

The Greenbook forecasts that we examine are not unconditional forecasts; they are conditional on monetary policy
assumptions. Improbable monetary policy assumptions will
make fiscal policy forecasts unrealistic to the extent that those
assumptions affect forecast economic activity and the financing costs of the government debt. Given that previous studies
have found Greenbook forecasts for economic activity to be
quite good as unconditional forecasts, we expect such effects
to be small. Thus, we expect the Greenbook forecasts to be of
great interest. To our knowledge, the only previous study to
have used Greenbook forecasts of fiscal variables is Auerbach
and Gorodnichenko (2012), who used them only to construct
measures of fiscal innovations and provide no direct analysis
of their properties.1
B. Lessons from the European Union

Because of the Maastricht Treaty, researchers have devoted
considerable effort to European fiscal forecasts, beginning
in the late 1990s. The fiscal forecasting literature, summarized by Leal et al. (2008), shows that some of the same
issues of bias and inefficiency exist in Europe as in the United
States. Although each country creates its own forecast, the
European Commissions’s (EC) oversight of the forecasting
process helps to control forecast errors. As Leal et al. note,
“Most studies on forecast track records tend to signal that
projections by the EC for European countries are the most
accurate within international organisations publishing fiscal
forecasts, due to its being an independent authority.”2 In contrast, Beetsma, Giuliodori, and Wierts (2009) find that fiscal
adjustments systematically fall short of forecast adjustments
and that this shortfall increases with the forecast horizon.
They also present evidence suggesting that as adjustment
shortfalls accumulate, governments increasingly resort to creative accounting to mask the problem. Frankel (2011) finds
that official forecasts of budget surpluses and overall growth
are more (optimistically) biased in the case of Eurozone
governments than for other nations he examines.
However, as is the case with the U.S. CBO, the EC is
constrained to forecast based on “present policies,” so its forecasts are not truly unconditional. Still, Artis and Marcellino
(2001) find no statistically significant differences between
the IMF, the OECD, and the EC in deficit/GDP forecasts for
European countries, where the former two institutions presumably produce unconditional forecasts. Merola and Perez
(2013) find that some of the same biases that are apparent
in government forecasts are also apparent for supposedly
independent agencies such as the EC.
The Greenbook forecasts of fiscal variables may be of interest for at least two reasons. First, to the extent that they are
1 There are several important differences between their work and ours.
Most notably, they use only one-quarter-ahead forecasts for the growth
rates of overall government spending and some of its components. We
examine forecasts at multiple horizons for the level of federal government
expenditures, receipts, and other variables.
2 See Leal et al. (2008, p. 350).
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indicative of expected fiscal policy, they may provide insight
into the uncertainty surrounding future changes in such policy
as well as a measure of anticipated and unanticipated fiscal
shocks.3 Second, to the extent that they capture the FOMC’s
expectations of fiscal policy, they may provide insight into the
factors that have shaped monetary policy. However, the latter depend on the extent to which the FOMC has considered
fiscal policy to be an important factor. We examine this question quantitatively later in the paper. Before considering the
forecasts themselves, however, we review some of the Federal Reserve Board’s public statements on the relationship
between U.S. monetary and fiscal policy.
III.

Narrative Evidence

One of the clearest examples of the importance that the
Federal Reserve sometimes attaches to fiscal policy occurred
recently, when sequestration was to impose cuts in federal
spending at the start of March 2013. In his semiannual Monetary Policy Report to Congress just a few days before the
cuts were to take effect, Federal Reserve chair Ben Bernanke
devoted almost a third of his prepared remarks to fiscal
policy, urging Congress to adopt a less contractionary fiscal
policy in the short term to help support economic growth.4
A few weeks later, responding to a reporter after the March
2013 FOMC meeting, the chairman replied, “Federal fiscal
restraint in 2013 is cutting something like 1 21 percentage
points off of growth, which, of course, is very significant.
So, that is an issue for us. We—you know, we take as given
what the fiscal authorities are doing. The economy is weaker.
Job creation is slower than it would be otherwise. And so, that
is one of the reasons that our policy has been as aggressive
as it is. That being said, as I’ve said many times, monetary
policy cannot offset a fiscal restraint of that magnitude, and
so the final outcome will be worse—or, in terms of jobs—
than would have been the case with less fiscal restraint.” For
the remainder of that year and much of the following year,
the press release following every FOMC meeting noted that
“fiscal policy is restraining economic growth.”
3 The relationship between private expectations and the Greenbook forecasts of fiscal variables is hard to assess, not least because the latter are
published only after a delay of at least five years. We leave this question for
future research.
4 “Although monetary policy is working to promote a more robust recovery, it cannot carry the entire burden of ensuring a speedier return to
economic health. The economy’s performance both over the near term
and in the longer run will depend importantly on the course of fiscal policy. . . . Recent progress in lowering the deficit has been concentrated in
near-term budget changes, which, taken together, could create a significant
headwind for the economic recovery. . . . This additional near-term burden
on the recovery is significant. . . . The Congress and the Administration
should consider replacing the sharp, frontloaded spending cuts required by
the sequestration with policies that reduce the federal deficit more gradually in the near term but more substantially in the longer run. Such an
approach could lessen the near-term fiscal headwinds facing the recovery
while more effectively addressing the longer-term imbalances in the federal budget.” Ben S. Bernanke, Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the
Congress before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC, February 26, 2013.
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This makes clear that the board thought fiscal policy was an
important determinant of overall economic conditions (and
at the time, one that could not be fully offset by monetary
policy).5 However, our period of interest is that covered by
the Greenbooks (from 1965 on), one that saw considerable
variation in both monetary and fiscal policy and in economic
conditions. In the remainder of this section, we review public
statements from the board and its members in chronological
order. With few exceptions, we will see that there has been
considerable consistency over time in at least three aspects of
the stated relationship between fiscal and monetary policy:
1. They acknowledge that fiscal and monetary policy
jointly determine economic conditions.
2. Fiscal policy is thought to affect the economy primarily
through its contribution to overall aggregate demand.6
3. The board takes fiscal policy as exogenous; its members
ignore possible reactions of fiscal policy to their policy
choices.7
That said, we can find statements explicitly linking fiscal and monetary policy throughout much of the Greenbook
period. Chairman Martin’s congressional testimony contained such remarks as “Much of the burden of accomplishing
the containment of domestic demand pressures this year will
rest on monetary policy, for . . . fiscal policy is scheduled
to become less restrictive after midyear.”8 He also noted that
“one curious concern voiced in the press is that our action
might hamper the Administration in its efforts to introduce a
‘tough’ budget next year. Nonsense. . . . It is monetary policy
that must adapt itself to the hard facts of the budget—and not
the other way ’round.”9
During his nomination hearings, Arthur F. Burns testified,
“Once doubts, which are very extensive, about our fiscal policy are resolved, . . . then I think we can have an easing of
monetary policy such as you desire and such as I desire.”10
5 Another striking example of the board’s attention to fiscal policy came in
the late 1990s with the arrival of substantial federal government surpluses.
At the time, projections suggested a possible future shortage of government
bonds in financial markets, leading board economists to consider how to
conduct monetary policy in the absence of federal government debt. The
recession of 2001 and subsequent tax cuts eliminated this “problem,” but it
is clear that the Fed was quite concerned about the potential supply of an
asset central to its conduct of monetary policy.
6 Another place we see this is in the narrative structure of the discussion in
most Greenbooks. Reviewing “Domestic Nonfinancial Developments,” the
discussion starts with components of consumption, followed by investment
and then by fiscal measures, mirroring the standard C + I + G of national
expenditure accounting.
7 To be sure, there are also numerous examples of board members publicly
trying to influence fiscal policy, typically by urging legislators to do more
to reduce projected deficits over the medium and longer terms.
8 William McChesney Martin Jr., “Statement before the Joint Economic Committee,” February 26, 1969, https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title
/?id=448#!7936.
9 William McChesney Martin Jr., “The Federal Reserve’s Role in the
Economy: Remarks before the 59th Annual Meeting of the Life Insurance
Association of America,” New York City, December 8, 1965.
10 Nomination of Arthur F. Burns: Hearing before the Committee on
Banking and Currency, U.S. Senate, Ninety-First Congress, First Session on the Nomination of Arthur F. Burns to Be a Member of the
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His successor, G. William Miller, testified at his own nomination hearings, “I think the question of what interest rates
will be in the future, whether they could be lowered or raised,
will depend a great deal on how the economy behaves for the
balance of this year and what fiscal measures are taken in
this Congress—on what happens with the tax proposals. . . .
I think it’s an interrelation between action on the fiscal side
and action on the monetary side that sets the direction of the
economy . . . . I don’t think monetary policy can operate in
isolation from what is going on in other parts of the system.”11
After this early period, we can also look at the board’s
monetary policy reports to Congress to understand the role
that fiscal policy has played in monetary policy formulation. The first such report in 1979 included responses to
specific questions about the interplay of fiscal and monetary policy, such as, “How should monetary and fiscal policy
be coordinated? . . . It is essential that the overall thrust of
monetary and fiscal policy be in the direction of restraint of
aggregate demand if domestic inflationary pressures are to
be reduced. . . . Can monetary policy offset expansive fiscal policy? It is possible for tight monetary policies to offset
an expansive fiscal policy. It would not appear that there is
currently any reason for substantial concern about monetary
and fiscal policies working a [sic] cross-purposes; there is
good communication among the policymakers involved and
a broad recognition of the problems confronting the nation.”12
Perhaps the most important departure from this paradigm
begins in the late 1970s with the shift to monetary aggregate targeting under chairman Volcker. As before, the Fed
appears to take fiscal policy as both exogenous and an important codeterminant of overall economic outcomes. However,
the conduct of monetary policy is perceived to be much more
independent of the future course of fiscal policy under this
policy regime. In congressional testimony, this often took the
form of of the Fed chair discussing how changes in future fiscal variables would affect economic outcomes (particularly
interest rates) without any suggestion that monetary policy
would adjust as a result.13 This in turn may simply have
reflected the limited influence that fiscal variables have on
monetary aggregates (such as the growth rate of M2 or the
ratio of nonborrowed to borrowed reserves).
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, December 18, 1969,
https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/?id=783.
11 Nomination of G. William Miller: Hearing before the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, Ninety-Fifth Congress,
Second Session, on the Nomination of G. William Miller to Be Chairman
of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board, January 24, 1978,
https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/?id=268.
12 “Federal Reserve’s First Monetary Policy Report for 1979: Hearings
before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate,
Ninety-Sixth Congress, First Session,” Monetary Policy Oversight—Senate
Hearings (February 20, 23, 1979), p. 111. https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
/title/?id=671#!22306.
13 As one of many examples, see Volcker’s discussion of the budgetary
situation starting on p. 11 of Federal Reserve’s Second Monetary Policy
Report for 1983: Hearings before the Committee on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, and the Subcommittee on Economic
Policy, Ninety-Eighth Congress, First Session, https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
/title/?id=671#!22315.

By the 1990s, however, the Fed had put a greater emphasis on transparency and we have more explicit statements
about policy formulation at the Board of Governors. For
example, the 1998 Gillis Lecture by Laurence H. Meyer
(governor from 1996 to 2002) in particular gives a detailed
view of the FOMC decision process.14 At this time, Congress had adopted pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) rules that had
greatly restricted the scope for discretionary fiscal policy.
During this period, while we again see that the Fed appears to
take fiscal policy as both exogenous and an important codeterminant of overall economic outcomes, the assumptions
are that the burden of stabilization policy will fall on monetary policy, while other goals will dictate the course of fiscal
policy. For example, Meyer summed up the relationship as
follows: “My reading is that both monetary and fiscal policies, via their influence on aggregate demand, affect output
and employment in the short run. . . . In practice, recently and
for the indefinite future, fiscal policy is dominated with the
task of reducing the deficit, leaving the stabilization objective
almost exclusively in the hands of the Federal Reserve.”15
Similarly, Governor Ned Gramlich discussed the roles of
the monetary and fiscal authorities in stablization policy and
concluded, “On the monetary side, authorities should try to
stabilize the economy without anticipating help from fiscal
policy.”16
The expiry of the PAYGO rules and the return of large
fiscal deficits early in the new century caused Fed governors to repeatedly mention fiscal policy as a source of both
long-run concern and near-term economic shocks. For example, chairman Greenspan noted in congressional testimony,
“The fiscal issues that we face pose long-term challenges, but
federal budget deficits could cause difficulties even in the relatively near term. . . . Should investors become significantly
more doubtful that the Congress will take the necessary fiscal
measures, an appreciable backup in long-term interest rates is
possible. . . . Such a development could constrain investment
and other interest-sensitive spending.”17
This interaction of monetary and fiscal policy gives the
board staff strong motivation to forecast fiscal variables well.
Significant time and effort are invested, and there is discussion of fiscal policy in every FOMC Greenbook. In the next
two sections, we describe our new data set of Greenbook
fiscal variables and then consider their forecast behavior.

14 Laurence H. Meyer, “Come with Me to the FOMC,” remarks at
the Gillis Lecture, Willamette University, Salem, Oregon, April 2, 1998,
https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/?id=936#!36332.
15 Laurence H. Meyer, “Monetary Policy Objectives and Strategy,”
remarks before the National Association of Business Economists 38th
Annual Meeting, Boston, September 8, 1996, https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
/title/?id=936#!36375.
16 Edward M. Gramlich, “A Stabilization Policy Strategy,” remarks before
the Wharton Public Policy Forum Series, Philadelphia, April 22, 1999,
https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/?id=914#!35463.
17 Alan Greenspan, “Federal Reserve Board’s Semiannual Monetary
Policy Report to the Congress,” testimony before the Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, February 11, 2004, p. 10,
https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/?id=452#!8806.
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IV.

Greenbook Fiscal Forecasts—A New Data Set

To assess the Fed’s ability to forecast fiscal variables and
their influence on monetary policy, we first compiled fiscal
forecasts from all Greenbooks from August 1967 to December 2010.18 The Greenbook reports the Federal Reserve Board
staff’s forecasts before every FOMC meeting (which typically take place at least twice per quarter). We examine the
first and last Greenbook of each quarter to obtain a consistent
data set with eight forecasts of quarterly data per year.
In each Greenbook, we gathered all the quarterly federal
fiscal forecasts and reports of past data that are available
for receipts, expenditures, the surplus, the high-employment
budget surplus (HEB), a version of HEB based on a 6.1% or
6.0% natural rate of unemployment (which we call HEB6),
the unemployment rate, and nominal output.19 The HEB
variables are designed to measure the cyclically adjusted or
“structural” budget surplus. This is the board staff’s counterfactual estimate of what the surplus (or deficit) would be
if the unemployment rate were at a constant reference level
over the forecast horizon.20 The budget deficit concept used
in HEB always corresponds to that used in the surplus/deficit
measure.
The occasional redefinition of some of our data series
caused complications. For example, beginning in 1996, overall government spending was replaced by government consumption expenditures and investment. Government spending on investment was removed from expenditures, but depreciation of capital was added. So in periods when government
investment exceeded depreciation, government expenditures
were revised downward. This caused both the surplus as well
as GDP to be revised upward. Another important change
came in October 1999, when the BEA began treating government expenditures on software as investment. Again, this
caused downward revisions to government expenditures and
upward revisions to the surplus. Also, beginning in the early
1980s, HEB was based on a 6% natural rate of unemployment,
but before that, the assumed natural rate of unemployment
varied as it drifted up from an initial 4% rate.
Our primary data sources were page scans of the Greenbook independently published by the Federal Reserve Board
and the Real-Time Data Research Center at the Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.21 After initial data entry and
error checking by a commercial firm, we compared some
18 The underlying data are available at the websites of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Philadelphia and the Federal Reserve Board of Governors. See
the online appendix for details. As with other FOMC briefing materials,
Greenbooks are not released for at least five years. Our sample ends with the
Greenbooks for 2010; in earlier work, we also examined samples excluding
the global financial crisis.
19 All the fiscal variables are reported on a National Income and Product
Accounts (NIPA) basis rather than a fiscal-year basis.
20 From September 1988 onward, HEB estimates were also accompanied
by estimates of the fiscal impetus.
21 See the Federal Reserve Board website for FOMC Historical
Materials (www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomc_historical.htm)
and the Philadelphia Fed’s Real-Time Data Research Center website
(www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/real-time-center/).
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series (e.g., unemployment) against known values from other
sources and checked the rest against the original PDF files. We
believe our data to be at least as accurate as other published
sources and our error rate to be less than 0.05%. The online
appendix to this paper provides extensive details on the construction of our data set. Figure 1 shows a sample Greenbook
page. Each variable in it can be represented as a string of estimates for past quarters (e.g., horizons −1, −2), the current
quarter (horizon 0), and future quarters (e.g., horizons 1, 2).
The forecast horizons reported in the Greenbook varied
considerably over time, as shown in figure 2. Greenbook forecasts generally go to the end of a calendar year; as the year
progresses, we see somewhat fewer quarters of forecasts and
somewhat more quarters of historical data. Both then change
abruptly once a year when forecasts for the next calendar year
are added. The earliest Greenbooks we recorded might contain only two quarters of forecasts and four quarters of current
and historical estimates; none contained estimates more than
twelve quarters ahead or into the past. As we examine longer
forecast horizons (particularly those more than four quarters
ahead), our sample is progressively drawn from more recent
Greenbooks. For that reason, when comparing results across
different forecast horizons, we sometimes restrict the sample
period. For forecast horizons up to four quarters, all of our
series have at least one forecast per year from the first meeting
in 1974Q4 onward.22 Table 1 shows definitions of the variables, their forecast horizons, and the number of observations
by period.
After compiling the raw data, we normalized all fiscal variables, dividing them by the corresponding Greenbook values
for nominal output (GNP before 1992, GDP from 1992 on).23
The string diagram in figure 3, which shows the budget surplus as a share of GDP (or GNP), provides a concise overview
of the relevant fiscal trends and the Greenbook’s forecasts.
For example, the early 1990s was a period when projections
of steadily improving fiscal balances were met with a steadily
deteriorating deficit. By the late 1990s, however, projections
of roughly constant deficits and surpluses missed a sustained
fiscal improvement. After 2001, however, we see a return to
a pattern of persistently overoptimistic projected surpluses.24
V.

Evaluating the Forecasts

Forecast evaluation requires a comparison of forecasts
with a measure of outcomes. As the literature shows (see
Croushore, 2011), the revision of published data means that
the choice of outcome measures (also called realized or actual
values) may affect our results.
To evaluate the Greenbook forecasts, we use the last
reported value before a benchmark revision of the National
22 Expenditures, receipts, HEB, and HEB6 typically have the shortest
forecast horizons.
23 Note that our output series were recorded in levels, not growth rates.
24 This pattern looks different from the behavior we see in the first half
of the sample, something we investigated in Croushore and van Norden
(2014).

938

THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
Figure 1.—A Sample Greenbook Page

A typical Greenbook page showing a variety of fiscal forecasts; this one is from January 1997.

Figure 2.—Greenbook Forecast Horizons by Date and Series

The horizons of the Greenbook forecasts vary by variable and have generally risen over time. Data are from the first FOMC meeting of each quarter.
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Table 1.—Summary Table of Greenbook Fiscal Forecasts
Variable definitions
Surplus: The conventionally measured federal government budget surplus (negative for deficit); equals receipts minus expenditures.
Expenditures: Federal government current expenditures; major redefinitions occurred in 1996 when investment was removed from expenditures and
capital depreciation was added, and in 1999 when spending on software was reclassified as investment.
Receipts: Federal government receipts from all sources.
HEB: The high-employment budget surplus, based on assumed natural rates of unemployment, which rose from 4.0% initially to 6.1% in 1983Q4
HEB6: The high-employment budget surplus based on a 6.0% or 6.1% natural rate of unemployment over time, beginning in 1980Q4; HEB = HEB6
beginning in 1983Q4.
Forecast availability
Pre-1981: Irregular pattern of forecast horizons, generally two to six quarter horizons.
1981–1988: Typically seven quarters in Q1, six in Q2, five in Q3, four in Q4.
1989–1992: Irregular pattern of forecast horizons, generally five to ten quarter horizons.
1993–2010: Typically eight quarters in Q1, seven in Q2, six in Q3, nine Q4.
All of the fiscal variables are reported in nominal terms. We divide forecasts of fiscal variables by forecasts of nominal output and realizations of fiscal variables by realized nominal output.

Figure 3.—Greenbook Government Surplus Forecasts

This string diagram shows both the history and the forecasts for the surplus over time. You can see periods when the surplus forecasts were persistently too high (as in the early 1990s) or too low (as in the second
half of the 1990s).

Income and Product Accounts (NIPA), called prebenchmark
data, for expenditure, receipts, and surplus measures that
are part of the NIPA.25 Redefinitions of the variables during benchmark revisions, especially the major redefinitions
made in 1999, make the evaluation of forecasts using fully
revised data problematic. Benchmark revisions in particular may cause a researcher to find widespread evidence of
forecast bias simply because the precise definition of the
series has changed since the forecasts were made, so that
the currently published series give a distorted view of the
forecast’s performance. The prebenchmark data are the most
fully revised data available at each date under a consistent
25 We constructed prebenchmark series using original vintage data from
the ALFRED database at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.

methodology.26 For conceptual variables that are not part of
the NIPA data, we use the last value published in the Greenbook, which we call “last reported.” The conceptual variables
are the structural surplus measures, HEB and HEB6.27
The Greenbook forecasts have a reputation for excellence in forecasting macroeconomic variables, as Romer and
Romer (2000) show. Are they as good at forecasting fiscal policy variables? To find out, we tested them for bias in several
ways.
26 This means omitting forecasts made just before a benchmark change
for which official estimates were published only after the change.
27 In an earlier version of this paper, Croushore and van Norden (2014), we
examined other measures, including the first officially published estimate,
the officially reported value as of one year after the initial release, and the
“current” official estimate, which was current as of December 2012. This
had only limited effects on the results.
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Table 2.—Summary Results of Bias Tests
Surplus

Expenditures

Receipts

HEB

Horizon

First

Last

First

Last

First

Last

0
1
2
3
4
1–4

0.48
0.96
0.39
0.17
0.14
0.32

0.87
0.86
0.43
0.24
0.15
0.29

0.06∗
0.53
0.78
0.53
0.48
0.61

0.13
0.51
0.92
0.73
0.58
0.63

0.31
0.59
0.21
0.07∗
0.04∗∗
0.14

0.07∗
0.74
0.22
0.08∗
0.04∗∗
0.16

HEB6

First

Last

First

Last

< 0.01∗∗∗
< 0.01∗∗∗
< 0.01∗∗∗
< 0.01∗∗∗
< 0.01∗∗∗
< 0.01∗∗∗

< 0.01∗∗∗
< 0.01∗∗∗
< 0.01∗∗∗
< 0.01∗∗∗
< 0.01∗∗∗
< 0.01∗∗∗

0.04∗∗
0.05∗
0.04∗∗
0.02∗∗
0.02∗∗
0.09∗

0.03∗∗
0.13
0.07∗
0.03∗∗
0.02∗∗
0.08∗

The figures shown are p-values for tests of the null hypothesis that the mean forecast error is 0. Asterisks indicate the p-values associated with tests of the null hypothesis that the median forecast error is 0 (*/**/***
indicate p-values less than 10/5/1%). Calculations use Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors with the number of lags equal to the forecast horizon because the data are known with a
lag of one period and because we face the overlapping-observations problem. The sample period is based on forecasts made from 1974Q4 to 2010Q4, except for HEB6, for which the sample begins in 1981Q1. “First”
and “Last” refer to the first and last FOMC meetings of each quarter. The measure of outcomes used to evaluate the forecast is the prebenchmark value (the last official estimate published prior to a benchmark revision
of the series) for surplus, expenditures, and receipts and the last reported value in the Greenbook for HEB and HEB6.

Table 3.—Zero-Median Tests of Forecast Errors
Surplus
Horizon
0
1
2
3
4

First
0.43
0.42∗
0.37∗
0.36
0.34

Expenditures
Last

First

0.46
0.42∗
0.38
0.38
0.31

∗∗

0.60
0.53
0.41
0.38
0.23∗∗∗

Receipts

Last
∗∗

0.58
0.51
0.45
0.40
0.20∗∗∗

First
0.53
0.51
0.42
0.45
0.31

HEB
Last
∗∗∗

0.61
0.50
0.41
0.36
0.34

First
∗∗

0.60
0.60∗∗∗
0.62∗
0.64
0.54

HEB6
Last
∗∗∗

0.66
0.59∗∗
0.65∗∗
0.62
0.57

First

Last

0.56
0.57∗
0.58
0.59
0.45

0.58∗
0.53
0.61
0.56
0.55

The figures shown are the proportion of forecast errors > 0. Asterisks indicate the p-values associated with tests of the null hypothesis that the median forecast error is 0 (*/**/*** indicate p-values less than 10/5/1%).
Test size is corrected for overlapping forecast horizons; see Campbell and Ghysels (1995) for details. The sample period is based on forecasts made from 1974Q4 to 2010Q4, except for HEB6, for which the sample is
1981Q1 to 2010Q4. “First” and “Last” refer to the first and last FOMC meetings of each quarter. The measure of outcomes used to evaluate the forecast is the prebenchmark value (the last official estimate published
prior to a benchmark revision of the series) for surplus, expenditures, and receipts and the last reported value in the Greenbook for HEB and HEB6.

A. Bias

A basic test of forecast performance is the MincerZarnowitz test, regressing the realized values of a variable
on a constant and the forecasts. If the forecasts are unbiased,
the constant term should be 0, and the coefficient on the forecasts should equal 1. However, Mankiw and Shapiro (1986)
show that in small samples (the case here), such tests may
reject too often because the right-hand-side variable is often
autocorrelated and thus correlated with lags in the error term.
Instead, a zero-mean forecast error test covers the same concept (and is a necessary condition for unbiasedness) without
being subject to the small-sample bias.
The results of tests for forecast bias are summarized in
table 2. The table shows p-values for the null hypothesis of
no bias for six forecast horizons (zero, one, two, three, and
four quarters ahead, as well as the average value of the variable over the next four quarters, labeled 1 to 4), two different
meeting times during the quarter (first and last), and five different variables (surplus, expenditures, receipts, HEB, and
HEB6). The forecast error is defined as the forecast minus
the realized value of the variable. Its estimated standard error
adjusts for the usual overlapping observations problem using
Newey-West robust standard errors with lag length equal to
the forecast horizon minus 1.
There is no significant evidence of bias for forecasts of
the budget surplus and little evidence of bias for expenditure
forecasts at any horizon. Receipts forecasts are significantly
biased (forecasts exceeded realizations, on average) at several
horizons, especially longer ones. HEB forecasts are biased for
all horizons (again with forecasts exceeding realizations, on

average), while there is somewhat less, but still considerable,
evidence of bias for HEB6, suggesting that the drift in the
benchmark rate of unemployment prior to the early 1980s is
responsible for much of the bias.28
Some researchers criticize tests of the mean forecast error
for their sensitivity to large outliers and lack of power in
some situations. We therefore also performed tests of the null
hypothesis that the median forecast error was 0, following
Campbell and Dufour (1991), and Campbell and Ghysels
(1995), also called sign tests.29 Table 3 shows the p-values
of the test statistic of the null hypothesis that forecast errors
have a median of 0.
The results provide evidence of median forecast bias at
some forecast horizons for all series. Consistent with the zeromean tests showing bias in HEB, the zero-median tests also
confirm the presence of some bias in all other variables, with
the weakest evidence of bias in the surplus.
The results suggest that most Greenbook forecasts of
the fiscal variables show significant median forecast biases,
especially at short horizons. On the one hand, this might simply be due to skewness in the forecast errors. On the other
hand, it is likely that the Fed’s staff spends much more time
and attention on macroeconomic forecasts at longer horizons that may be more relevant to monetary policy decision
making than on the fiscal “nowcasts.”
28 In an earlier version of this paper, we used a sample ending in 2006 and
found no significant evidence of bias in the receipts or HEB6. We conclude
that much of the evidence of bias that we see in table 2 for these variables
is concentrated around the time of the 2008 financial crisis.
29 These tests control for serial correlation in forecast errors caused by
overlapping forecasts and allow for exact inference in small samples.
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Table 4.—Greenbook versus CBO
Variable
Horizon (years)
RMSFE: Greenbook
RMSFE: CBO
H0 : Equal quadratic loss
H0 : Equal absolute loss
H0 : GB encompasses CBO
H0 : CBO encompasses GB

Surplus
0
0.0086
0.0092
0.726
0.578
0.465
0.252

Receipts
1
0.0141
0.0171
0.251
0.221
0.378
0.185

0
0.0049
0.0067
0.031
0.022
0.800
0.003

Expenditures
1
0.0103
0.0121
0.034
0.156
0.099
0.015

0
0.0052
0.0058
0.342
0.671
0.564
0.017

1
0.0088
0.0107
0.142
0.333
0.375
0.071

RMSFE: root-mean-squared forecast error. Figures shown for the null hypothesis of equal quadratic or absolute loss are p-values associated with the Harvey, Leybourne, and Newbold (1997) modified Diebold-Mariano
test statistic of the corresponding null hypothesis. Figures in the final two rows are p-values for tests of the null hypothesis of forecast encompassing using the statistic proposed by Harvey, Leybourne, and Newbold
(1998) and incorporate their proposed small-sample adjustment. p-values < 5% are in bold.

B. Forecast Comparisons

Another way to understand the performance of the Greenbook forecasts is to compare their accuracy with that of other
forecasters. This kind of comparison is complicated by several factors, however. Many forecasters (including the IMF
and the OECD) forecast the general government sector rather
than the federal government. Some forecast variables on a
budget accounting basis rather than a national income and
product accounts basis. Many forecast only annual rather than
quarterly totals, and their forecasts are updated less frequently
than the Greenbook. Finally, nearly all cover a much shorter
historical period.
In light of these limitations, perhaps the best available comparison for the Greenbook forecasts are those produced by
the CBO for the annual federal government surplus, expenditures, and receipts. In interpreting these results, it should
be recalled that the CBO forecast conditions on distinctly
different assumptions. In particular, the CBO’s constraint to
forecast the variables based on “current policy” might well
lead their forecasts astray at times when Congress is expected
to change policy in a significant way.
We take the first CBO forecast of each year and compare
it to the corresponding Greenbook forecast by combining the
four quarterly Greenbook forecasts to compute the implied
annual forecast.30 Both sets of forecasts are compared in
table 4. Forecasts for the current and next calendar year
were available from 1982 to 2010, except for expenditures
and receipts where forecasts for the next calendar year were
available from only 1990 on.
Table 4 compares the performance of the Greenbook and
the CBO in a number of ways. The first two rows simply
report the root-mean-squared forecast errors. We see that
Greenbook forecasts are somewhat more accurate in every
case. The third and fourth rows test the null hypothesis that
the two forecasts have equal quadratic loss and absolute loss,
30 CBO forecasts for fiscal variables were divided by their forecast values
for nominal GNP or GDP to calculate the implied forecasts for output
shares. Similarly, we combined the Greenbook fiscal variables across four
consecutive quarterly horizons before converting to output shares using the
Greenbook’s output forecasts. The CBO forecasts were made in late January
or early February of each year, except for 1996, 2009, and 2010, when the
forecast was made in May, June, and May, respectively. Due to benchmark
changes in the National Income and Product Accounts, we omitted forecasts
whose outcomes were affected by definitional changes. The latter had only
a minor impact on our results.

respectively, and report the associated p-values.31 We find that
the Greenbook forecasts are significantly more accurate for
government receipts but not for expenditures or the surplus.32
The final two rows of the table provide the results of forecast encompassing tests. Forecast A is said to encompass
forecast B if the forecast errors of A are uncorrelated with the
forecasts of B. This implies that A is efficient in the sense that
the information in B cannot be used to improve A. Our results
show that we are able to strongly reject the null hypothesis
that the CBO forecasts encompass the Greenbook forecasts
of receipts and current-year expenditures (and we can reject
the same hypothesis for the year-ahead expenditures at the
10% level.)33 We find no comparable evidence to reject the
hypothesis that Greenbook forecasts encompass those of the
CBO. This implies that the former capture useful information that the CBO forecasts miss. One possible explanation
for this is the CBO’s requirement to forecast conditional on
“current law,” which forces them to omit information about
expected legislative changes.
VI.

Forecast Errors

Despite the narrative evidence we have given, one might
question whether the Fed’s expectations of fiscal variables
should matter much for monetary policy outcomes. In this
section, we first consider a weaker condition by examining
whether forecast errors for fiscal variables are correlated with
forecast errors of headline variables such as real growth and
inflation. We do so by simply regressing the latter on the
former, considering results for the full sample, the pre-1991
sample, and the post-1990 sample. As headline variables,
we used two inflation measures (CPI and the GDP deflator) and three real activity measures (real GDP growth, the
unemployment rate, and the output gap).34 Consistent with the
31 We use the modified Diebold-Mariano statistics proposed by Harvey,
Leybourne and Newbold (1997).
32 The evidence is weaker when we focus on absolute rather than quadratic
loss; we then find a significant difference only in the case of forecasts for
current-year receipts.
33 In all of these cases, our estimates implied that moving the CBO forecast more toward that of Greenbook would improve the former’s forecast
accuracy.
34 Unemployment rates were collected directly from Greenbooks. Forecasts for the other variables were taken from the Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia’s Greenbook database. Published series for CPI inflation and
the unemployment rate undergo little revision; we used July 2016 vintage
data from FRED (series UNRATE and CPIAUCSL) to measure outcomes
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Table 5.—Greenbook Forecast Errors for Unemployment Rate

Horizon
UNEMP = α + β · HEB
0Q First
2Q First
4Q First
UNEMP = α + β · SURPLUS
0Q First
2Q First
4Q First
UNEMP = α + β · RECEIPTS
0Q First
2Q First
4Q First
UNEMP = α + β · EXPEND
0Q First
2Q First
4Q First

Full Sample

Pre-1991

Post-1990

β

t-Stat

R

β

t-Stat

R

β

t-Stat

0.003
0.007
0.025

1.8
−4.8
−10.4

0.69
−0.94
−0.89

0.020
0.001
0.004

5.1
−2.0
5.0

2.79
−0.26
0.33

0.027
0.055
0.277

−3.8
−8.8
−27.8

−0.97
−1.43
−2.27

R2

β

t-Stat

R2

β

t-Stat

R2

β

t-Stat

0.067
0.302
0.410

−9.5
−26.1
−32.5

−1.68
−4.13
−4.46

0.127
0.381
0.420

−14.3
−33.9
−43.0

−1.92
−4.69
−3.84

0.001
0.186
0.478

0.8
−13.3
−25.2

0.27
−3.32
−4.44

R2

β

t-Stat

R2

β

t-Stat

R2

β

t-Stat

0.054
0.074
0.133

−12.1
−20.2
−30.6

−1.96
−2.94
−3.09

0.070
0.062
0.037

−16.3
−22.4
−23.0

−1.65
−2.18
−0.84

0.034
0.152
0.313

−6.5
−17.5
−34.0

−1.33
−2.64
−3.39

R2

β

t-Stat

R2

β

t-Stat

R2

β

t-Stat

0.017
0.345
0.528

6.2
44.0
55.3

1.16
4.14
4.83

0.064
0.482
0.674

14.0
57.0
71.8

1.95
6.11
5.67

0.045
0.071
0.390

−7.5
14.5
39.8

−1.95
2.27
4.63

R

2

2

2

This table reports the results of regressions of Greenbook unemployment rate forecast errors on forecast errors for the variables shown in the table. Estimation is by OLS, with HAC standard errors used to calculate
the t-statistics. The number of lags used was equal to 2(h + 1) where h is the forecast horizon rounded to the nearest quarter. Under the “Horizon” heading, “First” and “Last” indicate whether the forecast was made
during the first or last meeting of the quarter.

Greenbook forecasts, measures of inflation and output growth
were based on quarter-to-quarter changes expressed at annual
rates. We examined all forecast horizons from 0L (nowcasts
from the last meeting of the quarter) to 4F (4-quarter-ahead
forecasts from the first meeting of the quarter).35 We now
summarize the main results; complete results are presented
in the online appendix.
With few exceptions, correlations between errors in Greenbook inflation (PCPI and PGDP) forecasts and those in
fiscal balance (SURPLUS, HEB, and HEB6) were low
and typically insignificant.36 Correlations between errors in
Greenbook real output growth forecasts and fiscal balance
for these varibles. What we refer to as real GDP growth and the GDP deflator in fact use GNP data prior to 1992 (series GNPC96 and GNPDEF) and
GDP thereafter (series GDPC1 and GDPDEF). Outcomes were measured
using prebenchmark vintages of output from the Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis ALFRED database. The board staff’s estimates of the output gap
are those made available by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. Outcomes for the output gap were measured by the last-reported Greenbook
value.
35 Greenbook forecasts for the output gap and CPI inflation were available
from only August 1987 and October 1979, respectively. The resulting lack of
degrees of freedom made inference problematic in some cases, particularly
in the pre-1991 sample for longer-horizon forecasts of the output gap. In
addition, HEB and HEB6 are identical during the period for which we have
output gap data; we therefore consider only the gap’s relationship to HEB.
An earlier version of this paper used shorter series of Greenbook forecasts
(available from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis ALFRED database)
and core inflation (CPI, excluding food and energy) data in place of the
GDP deflator; results were qualitatively similar.
36 The R2 from these regressions was never more than 1% in the post-1990
sample and rarely more than 5% in the full sample. In the pre-1991 sample,
however, there was often statistically and economically significant evidence
of a positive relationship between inflation surprises and fiscal surprises.
This was strongest between HEB and inflation, where fiscal surprises typically accounted for 15% to 20% of the variance in inflation surprises and
a positive fiscal surprise (i.e., a larger-than-expected structural surplus) of
1% of output was associated with a positive inflation surprise (higher than
expected inflation) of almost 1%. However, the economic importance of

variables were also quite modest, although occasionally significant and positive.37 However, forecast errors in the fiscal
balance variables were most strongly and robustly correlated
with surprises in the unemployment rate and the output gap.
The relationship was strongest at longer forecast horizons,
where surprises in the surplus could account for over onethird of their variance of forecast errors in the output gap or
the unemployment rate. As shown in table 5 this reflected
both a significantly negative correlation between surprises
in the unemployment rate and those in federal government
receipts, as well as an even stronger positive correlation
between surprises in the unemployment rate and those in
federal government expenditures.
Overall, we find that while there is no apparent relationship between inflation and fiscal forecast errors, there is much
more evidence linking the latter to forecast errors for real
variables, particularly for unemployment rates and the output gap. This is consistent with the hypothesis that improved
fiscal forecasts would be linked to improved forecasts for key
real economic variables.

this effect was greatly reduced when using HEB6 or SURPLUS, suggesting that revisions in the benchmark rate of unemployment used to calculate
HEB accounted for much of this relationship.
37 The R2 from these regressions were rarely more than 5% in the full
sample, although somewhat higher in the subsamples. While surprises
in HEB were significantly negatively correlated with real growth surprises (higher-than-expected structural fiscal surpluses were associated with
lower-than-expected growth) in the pre-1991 sample, this relationship vanished in the post-1990 sample, as well as for the other two measures of
fiscal balance. This seemed to reflect upward shifts in the benchmark rate
of unemployment during the early part of the sample. Forecast errors for
all three fiscal balance variables had significantly positive correlations with
real growth surprises over longer forecast horizons in the post-1990 sample, although this explained only about 10% of the variance in real output
growth.
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VII.

Monetary Policy “Shocks”

Another way of understanding the potential importance of
the Fed’s fiscal forecasts is to examine their relationship to
estimates of exogenous monetary policy shocks. Romer and
Romer (2004) constructed what has become an often-used
measure of such shocks by regressing changes in the fed
funds rate target on a variety of control factors.38 The residuals are deemed to represent exogenous changes in policy.
In the Romers’ words, “Because we control for the Federal
Reserve’s forecasts of the paths of output and inflation, most
of those residual influences are appropriate for estimating
the impact of monetary policy on the economy.”39 However,
Rossi and Zubairy (2011) show that neglecting the role of
fiscal policy can distort our perceptions of monetary policy
and its effects. In the remainder of this section, we use our
Greenbook forecasts to investigate how taking account of fiscal variables alters Romer and Romer’s (2004) estimates of
monetary policy shocks.
We follow Coibion et al. (2012) in estimating the relationship over an expanded data sample ending in December
2008 (after which the federal funds rate was at its effective
lower bound).40 We added forecasts of the surplus and of
HEB in various combinations together with the revisions in
those forecasts.41 Because the potential sample period varies
slightly depending on the set of variables included, we take
care to reestimate the original Romer and Romer (2004) specification over precisely the sample period used for each of our
fiscal variable specifications.42
Coefficient estimates are presented in the online appendix.
Table 6 quantifies the statistical importance of fiscal variables
in these regressions. To better understand their economic
importance, we simulated the impact of the estimated monetary policy shocks on the federal funds rate.43 Changes in
the latter may be different from the former, as the latter takes
into account the impact of fiscal variables on the estimated
policy reaction function.

38 The control variables that they use consist of (a) the level of the fed
funds rate target prior to the FOMC meeting, (b) the estimated rate of
unemployment, and Greenbook estimates of past, current, and future values
of (c) inflation and (d) real output, as well as (e and f) revisions in these
forecasts from those of previous FOMC meeting.
39 Romer and Romer (2004, p. 1064).
40 We used the extended data set assembled by Coibion et al. (2012), available at http://eml.berkeley.edu/∼ygorodni/RR_MPshocks_Updated.xls.
41 We preferred the use of HEB rather than HEB6 in this analysis largely
because HEB better captured the headline variable presented to the FOMC.
As Romer and Romer (2004) argue, changes in the tastes or operating
procedures of the Federal Reserve constitute a potentially important source
of policy shocks. We take this to include their changing views about the
benchmark rate of unemployment.
42 In choosing the lags to include in the regression, we again follow Romer
and Romer (2004) and include lags −1 to 2Q for all variables other than
HEB; for the latter we used −1 to 4Q (although our results are robust to
this distinction). We prefered to use slightly longer lags for HEB because
we think that structural deficits are essentially exogenous with respect to
monetary policy shocks over a longer horizon.
43 To do so, we simply set all the control variables to 0 and shocked the
federal funds rate with the estimated OLS residuals.
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Table 6.—Revised Estimates of Romer and Romer (2004):
Summary Statistics
Surplus and
HEB and
Innovation Surplus Innovation
R2 with
R2 without
p-value (F)
Shock correlation
Impact correlation

0.2677
0.2334
0.0538
0.9774
0.9836

0.2635
0.2342
0.0106
0.9807
0.9853

0.3891
0.3087
0.0016
0.9401
0.9204

HEB

Surplus
and HEB

0.3588
0.2889
0.0001
0.9496
0.9332

0.3942
0.2889
0.0000
0.9230
0.6413

Results for revised estimates of exogenous monetary policy shocks based on Romer and Romer’s (2004)
OLS regression for changes in the federal funds rate target. Estimation ends in December 2008, after which
the target rate was constrained by the zero lower bound. Detailed estimation results are in the appendix.
and Innovation: Indicates that the regression includes the values of the indicated variable as well as the
change in its values from the previous FOMC meeting. p-value (F): p-value of the F-statistic testing the
null hypothesis that estimated coefficients on all included fiscal variables are jointly equal to 0. Shock
correlation: Correlation between policy shocks estimated when including and excluding fiscal variables.
Impact correlation: Correlation between impact of shocks on federal funds rate estimated when including
and excluding fiscal variables.

Table 6 shows that the addition of fiscal forecasts is
strongly statistically significant in almost every case, implying that the federal funds rate target has historically adjusted
in response to anticipated fiscal developments. The inclusion of the surplus boosts the regression R2 from 23% to
26%, while the inclusion of HEB boosts it from 29% to
36%. Changes in the estimated monetary policy shocks are
modest; correlations between the old and new shocks series
hover around the 94% to 98% range, while those between
the old and new impact series are slightly lower in the
case of HEB. However, the inclusion of either set of fiscal
variables attenuates the impact of the policy shocks on the
federal funds rate target. In particular, figure 4 shows that
including HEB reduces the expansionary effects of monetary
policy shocks throughout most of the 1970s while reducing their contractionary effects from the mid-1980s through
2000. Changes in either direction occasionally exceeded 150
basis points, which represents a substantive fraction of the
estimated overall impact of policy shocks.
Table 6 also shows that the addition of both HEB and the
surplus together has a substantially larger impact. The R2 rises
from 29% to 39%, the correlation between the shock series
falls to 92%, and that between the impact series falls to under
65%. These changes are reflected in figure 5, which shows
that the attenuation mentioned above becomes substantially
larger, with differences in the impact of policy shocks exceeding 250 basis points in the mid-1970s and briefly exceeding
300 basis points in mid-1998.44
While the above evidence suggests that fiscal policy has
influenced monetary policy targets, it is inconsistent with
conventional theories of fiscal dominance of monetary policy. The latter emphasize concerns over government financing
requirements, particularly in terms of overall debt levels.
However, this stock of debt is unlikely to be highly correlated
with the flow variables (deficits, revenues, and expenditures)
44 Part of the reason for the substantial change in the estimated impact
of shocks lies in the change in the estimated size of the error-correction
coefficient, which almost doubles from −0.018 to −0.033, implying less
shock persistence.
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Figure 4.—Monetary Policy Shocks with and without HEB

This figure shows how the addition of HEB alters estimates of monetary policy shocks and their impact on the federal funds rate target. The upper panel shows a scatter plot of results that ignore the fiscal variables
(x-axis) versus those that include fiscal variables (y-axis). Squares indicate OLS regression residuals (i.e., estimated policy shocks), while crosses indicate their estimated impact on the federal funds rate target. Time
series for the latter are also compared in the lower panel, where estimates excluding fiscal variables are labeled CGKS 2016.

Figure 5.—Monetary Policy Shocks with and without HEB and Surplus

This figure shows how the addition of HEB and SURPLUS alters estimates of monetary policy shocks and their impact on the federal funds rate target. The upper panel shows a scatter plot of results that ignore the
fiscal variables (x-axis) versus those that include fiscal variables (y-axis). Squares indicate OLS regression residuals (i.e., estimated policy shocks), while crosses indicate their estimated impact on the federal funds rate
target. Time series for the latter are also compared in the lower panel, where estimates excluding fiscal variables are labeled CGKS 2016.
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examined above. Proof of the latter is lacking, however, simply because the federal sector tables in the Greenbooks (as
well as the main tables of economic indicators) make no reference to federal government debt levels or financing costs.
This is consistent with the Greenbook’s overarching narrative focus on components of aggregate demand, but not with
concerns over the impact of monetary policy decisions on
government finance. We also note that even where fiscal variables appear most important, the results in table 6 show that
they explain only about 10% of the variance of changes in
the federal funds rate target, with exogenous monetary policy
shocks accounting for the lion’s share.
VIII.

Summary and Conclusion

The goal of this paper was to better understand the Federal
Reserve Board’s ability to understand and anticipate changes
in fiscal variables. To do so, we assembled a new data set containing a complete set of Greenbook fiscal forecasts spanning
many decades and several complete business cycles.
Our analysis highlighted both positive and negative aspects
of the forecasts’ performance. On the positive side, Greenbook forecasts of both the surplus and expenditures show
relatively small signs of bias and performed slightly better
than those of the CBO in terms of both mean-squared errors
and (in several cases) forecast encompassing. However, forecasts for other fiscal variables showed more severe evidence
of bias. The evidence of Greenbook superiority to the CBO
forecasts was less clear for expenditures and receipts. At
longer horizons, forecast errors for the fiscal variables were
strongly correlated with those for the unemployment rate
and output gap, but not with those for real output or inflation. Improvements in fiscal forecasts are therefore likely to
be related to improvements in forecasting those macroeconomics aggregates. Our analysis of monetary policy shocks,
as in Romer and Romer (2004), shows that monetary policymakers seem to respond to fiscal shocks in ways that
have been quantitatively important, consistent with the public statements of Federal Reserve chairmen and governors.
Therefore, understanding fiscal policy shocks is important
for the study and measurement of monetary policy shocks.
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